From the Lawton Constitution
By James Finck, Ph.D. Apr 19, 2026
What began as promising negotiations between the United States and Iran earlier this month ended in an impasse.
Following a massive U.S. bombing campaign against Iran that began in February, both sides agreed to a two-week ceasefire starting on April 8 to pursue a diplomatic resolution. On April 11, 2026, U.S. Vice President JD Vance, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner arrived in Islamabad for peace talks with Iranian officials.
The Iranian delegation presented a 10-point plan aimed at resolving the conflict. Key proposals included ending hostilities not only in Iran but also in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen; reopening the Strait of Hormuz; lifting sanctions on Iran; releasing frozen Iranian assets; and committing to forgo the pursuit of nuclear weapons. While President Trump did not accept these proposals outright, he described them as a workable starting point for negotiations.
Despite this initial optimism, the talks concluded without an agreement. Major obstacles for the American side included demands for the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities, the removal of all highly enriched uranium, and an end to Iran’s support for regional proxy groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah.
This is not the first time a critical negotiation involving American interests has stalled. In some ways, the situation echoes an earlier diplomatic challenge, particularly one faced by Theodore Roosevelt, a president who had many similar personality traits as President Trump.
In 1903, a central objective of U.S. foreign policy was the construction of a canal in Central America to provide the Navy with easier access between the Atlantic Ocean and Pacific Ocean. Initially, the United States considered building the canal through Nicaragua. However, when a French company — the New Panama Canal Company — offered to sell its project in the Colombian province of Panama, the U.S. quickly shifted its focus. Because Panama was still part of Colombia, the United States needed to negotiate a lease for the land.
To that end, Secretary of State John Hay negotiated with Colombia’s representative, Tomás Herrán. The proposed agreement, later known as the Hay–Herrán Treaty, offered Colombia $10 million upfront and annual payments of $250,000 for a 99-year lease on a six-mile-wide canal zone. The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on March 17, 1903.
However, the Colombian Senate was far less willing to approve the agreement. Colombian officials were wary of American power and uneasy about granting such a long lease with extensive autonomy. They were also frustrated by what they perceived as an unfair financial arrangement. While the U.S. planned to pay the French company $40 million, Colombia itself was only receiving $10 million.
Colombia attempted to delay ratification until the French company’s lease expired the following year, at which point the land would revert fully to Colombian control, potentially allowing them to negotiate a better deal.
The plan backfired for two reasons. First, the Americans refused to pay more, causing the Columbian Senate rejected the new lease deal. Secondly, T.R. did not like being told no.
Frustrated by Colombia’s refusal, Roosevelt shifted strategy. He signaled support for a Panamanian independence movement led by Dr. Manuel Amador Guerrero. During Guerrero’s visit to the United States in 1903, he received both political backing and financial assistance through the departing French company.
When the Colombian Navy moved to suppress the Panamanian rebellion, it was blocked by the USS Nashville, deployed by Roosevelt under the pretext of protecting American lives and interests. Roosevelt also quickly recognized Panamanian independence. With U.S. support, Panama successfully declared independence. The new Panamanian government, led by Guerrero, promptly approved a canal treaty with the United States under essentially the same terms previously offered to Colombia.
Both Roosevelt and Trump have shown a preference for “big stick” diplomacy in negotiations. In Roosevelt’s case, the strategy proved effective; the United States built and controlled the Panama Canal until it was transferred back to Panama during the Carter administration.
In the case of Trump and Iran, however, the outcome remains uncertain. Trump has ordered a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and may continue the bombing campaign. Unlike Colombia in 1903, Iran is led by a government driven more by ideology than concern for its citizens, and it remains unclear whether pressure alone will produce a diplomatic breakthrough.
James Finck is a professor of American history at the University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma. He can be reached at james.finck@swoknews.com.
Historically Speaking 