From the Lawton Constitution
By James Finck, Ph.D. Mar 8, 2026
Watching the news unfold about the attack on Iran, I find myself both excited and confused.
The excitement is easy to understand; there is the possibility of either a good, or even a very good outcome. A “good” outcome would be to damage Iran’s nuclear program and weaken its repressive regime’s ability to sponsor global terrorist groups. Going a step farther, a “very good” outcome, though it may take a miracle, would completely overthrow the regime and establish a democratic constitutional government.
What confuses me is the recent talk from several commentators about returning Iran to the constitutional monarchy that existed before the 1979 Islamic Revolution. One so-called “expert” even claimed that Iranians enjoyed the pre-revolutionary government and would welcome the return of Reza Pahlavi as a new shah. I do believe many Iranians desire democracy, but I have strong reservations about the authoritarian model that existed under the shah. Rather, I believe they long for something closer to the democratic system they attempted to build in the early 1950s.
Iran’s political history is long and complex, but for the sake of this discussion, the modern turning point begins with the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906. During that movement, merchants, religious leaders (ulama), and intellectuals revolted against the Qajar shah to demand greater representation and less British influence. The result was the 1906 Constitution, which created a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament (the Majlis). It emphasized separation of powers while also preserving a role for religious authorities to ensure that Islamic law was respected. It was an early attempt to balance representative government with Iran’s religious and cultural identity.
Another major shift came in 1925, when Reza Khan seized power, deposed the Qajar dynasty, and crowned himself Reza Shah Pahlavi, inaugurating the Pahlavi dynasty. He modernized and secularized Iran, but he did so in an authoritarian and highly centralized manner. To many in the West, secularization appears synonymous with progress since Western governments largely moved in that direction. But in Iran, forced secularization alienated significant portions of society. Policies such as banning the veil or restricting traditional religious dress like the turban were not seen as liberation, but as coercion. Forcing women to wear the veil is wrong; forbidding it is equally wrong. Both deny personal freedom.
In 1941, during World War II, British and Soviet forces invaded Iran, suspicious of Reza Shah’s perceived sympathies toward Nazi Germany. Under pressure, he abdicated in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. With the younger shah on the throne, parliament seized the opportunity to expand its authority.
In 1951, Mohammad Mosaddegh was elected prime minister. A nationalist and a genuine champion of the people, he sought to reduce the shah to a ceremonial role, as envisioned in the constitution. Against the shah’s wishes, Mosaddegh enacted democratic reforms and, most
notably, nationalized Iran’s oil industry, ending British control. For decades, Britain had profited enormously from Iranian oil while many Iranians remained in poverty.
In 1952, Mosaddegh demanded the authority to appoint his own minister of war, a power he believed the constitution granted to the prime minister, but which had traditionally been exercised by the shah. Control of that position meant control of the army’s loyalty. The shah dismissed Mosaddegh, triggering massive public protests. Fearing for his throne, the shah reinstated him and granted his demands, effectively reducing himself to the figurehead Mosaddegh had envisioned. During this turbulent period, the shah temporarily left Iran, reportedly for medical reasons.
While many Iranians celebrated their expanded freedoms, Britain was outraged by the loss of its oil interests. After failing to secure a favorable ruling at the International Court of Justice and gaining little traction at the United Nations, British leaders turned to the United States. Convinced by the British that Mosaddegh posed a communist threat, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles supported a covert operation that removed Mosaddegh and restored the shah to full authority.
With a firm Western backing, Mohammad Reza Shah consolidated power and established a far more repressive regime. His secret police, SAVAK, became notorious for surveillance, imprisonment, and torture of political opponents.
In the 1960s, the shah launched the White Revolution, a sweeping reform program that included land redistribution and expanded rights for women. While some reforms had positive effects, political freedoms remained tightly restricted, and religious leaders felt increasingly marginalized. This resentment contributed directly to the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis. Many revolutionaries believed they were preventing another foreign-backed betrayal of Iranian self-determination.
Now, in 2026, Iran once again stands at a precipice. If the Iranian people somehow are able to overthrow the current regime and establish a constitutional system, what will it look like? Some have proposed restoring a constitutional monarchy under Reza Pahlavi, son of the late shah, who has lived in the United States for decades. Recently, he has spoken publicly about supporting revolutionary change while insisting he does not seek power. Still, it is fair to question whether returning to the family associated with the 1953 coup and subsequent repression risks repeating the mistakes of the past.
Over the last century, Iran’s best opportunity for a functioning democracy may well have been under Mosaddegh. If Iranians are given another chance to build a democratic system, bringing back the dynasty that helped end that earlier experiment seems mistaken.
One final thought: if Iran succeeds in forming a new government, Americans should not expect it to mirror our own system. A durable Iranian democracy will not look exactly like a Western liberal model, nor should it. If a new constitution swings too far toward rigid secularism and ignores the religious and cultural foundations of Iranian society, it will likely struggle. Trading
one extreme for the other will not help. It must protect religious freedom and cultural identity while ensuring political rights and accountability.
This is not the West, and it does not have to be. When I was in grad school my Middle East professor always said the most significant scripture in the Bible to understand the difference between Christianity and Islamic world view is “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s.” In Islam, there is no such concept. Iran must be allowed to develop its own form of constitutional democracy, one that reflects its history, faith, and political experience. Only then will it have a real chance to endure.
_James Finck is a professor of American history at the University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma. He can be reached at james.finck@swoknews.com.
Historically Speaking 